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Abstract
Reward functions are easy to misspecify; although
designers can make corrections after observing
mistakes, an agent pursuing a misspecified reward
function can irreversibly change the state of its en-
vironment. If that change precludes optimization
of the correctly specified reward function, then cor-
rection is futile. For example, a robotic factory as-
sistant could break expensive equipment due to a
reward misspecification; even if the designers im-
mediately correct the reward function, the damage
is done. To mitigate this risk, we introduce an ap-
proach that balances optimization of the primary
reward function with preservation of the ability to
optimize auxiliary reward functions. Surprisingly,
even when the auxiliary reward functions are ran-
domly generated and therefore uninformative about
the correctly specified reward function, this ap-
proach induces conservative, effective behavior.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid expansion of the number of
tasks that reinforcement learning (RL) agents can learn to
complete, from Go ([Silver et al., 2016]) to Dota 2 ([OpenAI,
2018]). The designers specify the reward function, which
guides the learned behavior.
Reward misspecification can lead to strange agent behav-
ior, from purposefully dying before entering a video game
level in which scoring points is initially more difficult ([Saun-
ders et al., 2018]), to exploiting a learned reward predic-
tor by indefinitely volleying a Pong ball ([Christiano et al.,
2017]). Specification is often difficult for non-trivial tasks,
for reasons including insufficient time, human error, or lack of
knowledge about the relative desirability of states. [Amodei
et al., 2016] explain:
An objective function that focuses on only one as-
pect of the environment may implicitly express in-
difference over other aspects of the environment.
An agent optimizing this objective function might
thus engage in major disruptions of the broader en-
vironment if doing so provides even a tiny advan-
tage for the task at hand.
As agents are increasingly employed for real-world tasks,
misspecification will become more difficult to avoid and will
have more serious consequences. In this work, we focus on
mitigating these consequences.
The specification process can be thought of as an iterated
game. First, the designers provide a reward function. Using a
learned model, the agent then computes and follows a policy
that optimizes the reward function. The designers can then
correct the reward function, which the agent then optimizes,
and so on. Ideally, the agent should maximize the reward over
time, not just within any particular round – in other words,
it should minimize regret for the correctly specified reward
function over the course of the game.
For example, consider a robotic factory assistant. In-
evitably, a reward misspecification might cause erroneous be-
havior, such as going to the wrong place. However, we would
prefer misspecification not induce irreversible and costly mis-
takes, such as breaking expensive equipment or harming
workers.
Such mistakes have a large impact on the ability to opti-
mize a wide range of reward functions. Spilling paint im-
pinges on the many objectives which involve keeping the fac-
tory floor clean. Breaking a vase interferes with every objec-
tive involving vases. The expensive equipment can be used
to manufacture various kinds of widgets, so any damage im-
pedes many objectives. The objectives affected by these ac-
tions include the unknown correct objective. To minimize
regret over the course of the game, the agent should preserve
its ability to optimize the correct objective.
Our key insight is that by avoiding these impactful ac-
tions to the extent possible, we greatly increase the chance of
preserving the agent’s ability to optimize the correct reward
function. By preserving options for arbitrary objectives, one
can often preserve options for the correct objective – even
without knowing anything about it. Thus, without making as-
sumptions about the nature of the misspecification early on,
the agent can still achieve low regret over the game.
To leverage this insight, we consider a state embedding
in which each dimension is the optimal value function (i.e.,
the attainable utility) for a different reward function. We
show that penalizing distance traveled in this embedding nat-
urally captures and unifies several concepts in the litera-
ture, including side effect avoidance ([Amodei et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2018]), minimizing change to the state of the
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environment ([Armstrong and Levinstein, 2017]), and reacha-
bility preservation ([Moldovan and Abbeel, 2012; Eysenbach
et al., 2018]). We refer to this unification as conservative
agency: optimizing the primary reward function while pre-
serving the ability to optimize others.
Contributions. We frame the reward specification process
as an iterated game and introduce the notion of conserva-
tive agency. This notion inspires an approach called attain-
able utility preservation (AUP), for which we show that Q-
learning converges. We offer a principled interpretation of
design choices made by previous approaches – choices upon
which we significantly improve.
We run a thorough hyperparameter sweep and conduct an
ablation study whose results favorably compare variants of
AUP to a reachability preservation method on a range of
gridworlds. By testing for broadly applicable agent incen-
tives, these simple environments demonstrate the desirable
properties of conservative agency. Our results indicate that
even when simply preserving the ability to optimize uni-
formly sampled reward functions, AUP agents accrue pri-
mary reward while preserving state reachabilities, minimiz-
ing change to the environment, and avoiding side effects with-
out specification of what counts as a side effect.
2 Prior Work
Our proposal aims to minimize change to the agent’s ability
to optimize the correct objective, which directly helps reduce
regret over the specification process. In contrast, previous
approaches to regularizing the optimal policy were more in-
direct, minimizing change to state features ([Armstrong and
Levinstein, 2017]) or decrease in the reachability of states
([Krakovna et al., 2018]’s relative reachability). The latter is
recovered as a special case of AUP.
Other methods for constraining or otherwise mitigating the
consequences of reward misspecification have been consid-
ered. A wealth of work is available on constrained MDPs,
in which reward is maximized while satisfying certain con-
straints ([Altman, 1999]). For example, [Zhang et al., 2018]
employ a whitelisted constraint scheme to avoid negative side
effects. However, we may not assume we can specify all rel-
evant constraints, or a reasonable feasible set of reward func-
tions for robust optimization ([Regan and Boutilier, 2010]).
[Everitt et al., 2017] formalize reward misspecification
as the corruption of some true reward function. [Hadfield-
Menell et al., 2017b] interpret the provided reward function
as merely an observation of the true objective. [Shah et al.,
2019] employ the information about human preferences im-
plicitly present in the initial state to avoid negative side ef-
fects. While both our approach and theirs aim to avoid side
effects, they assume that the correct reward function is linear
in state features, while we do not.
[Amodei et al., 2016] consider avoiding side effects by
minimizing the agent’s information-theoretic empowerment
([Mohamed and Rezende, 2015]). Empowerment quantifies
an agent’s control over future states of the world in terms
of the maximum possible mutual information between fu-
ture observations and the agent’s actions. The intuition is
that when an agent has greater control, side effects tend to be
larger. However, empowerment is inappropriately sensitive to
the action encoding.
Safe RL ([Pecka and Svoboda, 2014; Garcı´a and
Ferna´ndez, 2015; Berkenkamp et al., 2017; Chow et al.,
2018]) focuses on avoiding irrecoverable mistakes during
training. However, if the objective is misspecified, safe RL
agents can converge to arbitrarily undesirable policies. Al-
though our approach should be compatible with safe RL tech-
niques, we concern ourselves with the consequences of the
optimal policy in this work.
3 Approach
Everyday experience suggests that the ability to achieve one
goal is linked to the ability to achieve a seemingly unrelated
goal. Reading this paper takes away from time spent learning
woodworking, and going hiking means you can’t reach the
airport as quickly. However, one might wonder whether these
everyday intuitions are true in a formal sense. In other words,
are the optimal value functions for a wide range of reward
functions thus correlated? If so, preserving the ability to op-
timize somewhat unrelated reward functions likely preserves
the ability to optimize the correct reward function.
3.1 Formalization
In this work, we consider a standard Markov decision pro-
cess (MDP) 〈S,A, T,R, γ〉 with state space S, action space
A, transition function T : S × A → ∆(S), reward function
R : S × A → R, and discount factor γ. We assume the ex-
istence of a no-op action ∅ ∈ A for which the agent does
nothing. In addition to the primary reward function R, we as-
sume that the designer supplies a finite set of auxiliary reward
functions called the auxiliary set, R ⊂ RS×A. Each Ri ∈ R
has a corresponding Q-function QRi . We do not assume that
the correct reward function belongs to R. In fact, one of our
key findings is that AUP tends to preserve the ability to op-
timize the correct reward function even when the correct re-
ward function is not included in the auxiliary set.
Definition (AUP penalty). Let s be a state and a be an action.
PENALTY(s, a) :=
|R|∑
i=1
|QRi(s, a)−QRi(s,∅)| . (1)
The penalty is the L1 distance from the no-op in a state
embedding in which each dimension is the value function for
an auxiliary reward function. This measures change in the
ability to optimize each auxiliary reward function.
We want the penalty term to be roughly invariant to the
absolute magnitude of the auxiliary Q-values, which can be
arbitrary (it is well-known that the optimal policy is invariant
to positive affine transformation of the reward function). To
do this, we normalize with respect to the agent’s situation.
The designer can choose to scale with respect to the penalty
of some mild action or, if R ⊂ RS×A>0 , the total ability to
optimize the auxiliary set:
SCALE(s) :=
|R|∑
i=1
QRi(s,∅), (2)
where SCALE : S → R>0 in general. With this, we are now
ready to define the full AUP objective:
Definition (AUP reward function). Let λ ≥ 0. Then
RAUP(s, a) := R(s, a)− λ PENALTY(s, a)SCALE(s) . (3)
Similar to the regularization parameter in supervised learn-
ing, λ is a regularization parameter that controls the influence
of the AUP penalty on the reward function. Loosely speak-
ing, λ can be interpreted as expressing the designer’s beliefs
about the extent to which R might be misspecified.
Lemma 2. ∀s, a : RAUP converges with probability 1.
Theorem 1. ∀s, a : QRAUP converges with probability 1.
The AUP reward function then defines a new MDP
〈S,A, T,RAUP, γ〉. Therefore, given the primary and aux-
iliary reward functions, the model-based agent in the iterated
game can compute RAUP and the corresponding optimal pol-
icy.
For our purposes, we simultaneously learn the optimal aux-
iliary Q-functions.
Algorithm 1 AUP update
1: procedure UPDATE(s, a, s′)
2: for i ∈ [ |R| ] ∪ {AUP} do
3: Q′ = Ri(s, a) + γmaxa′ QRi(s
′, a′)
4: QRi(s, a) += α(Q
′ −QRi(s, a))
5: end for
6: end procedure
3.2 Design Choices
Following the decomposition of [Krakovna et al., 2018], we
now explore two choices implicitly made by the PENALTY
definition: with respect to what baseline is penalty computed,
and using what deviation metric?
Baseline. An obvious candidate is the starting state. For
example, starting state relative reachability would compare
the initial reachability of states with their expected reachabil-
ity after the agent acts.
However, the starting state baseline can penalize the nor-
mal evolution of the state (e.g., the moving hands of a clock)
and other natural processes. The inaction baseline is the state
which would have resulted had the agent never acted.
As the agent acts, the current state may increasingly differ
from the inaction baseline, which creates strange incentives.
For example, consider a robot rewarded for rescuing erro-
neously discarded items from imminent disposal. An agent
penalizing with respect to the inaction baseline might rescue
a vase, collect the reward, and then dispose of it anyways. To
avert this, we introduce the stepwise inaction baseline, under
which the agent compares acting with not acting at each time
step. This avoids penalizing the effects of a single action mul-
tiple times (under the inaction baseline, penalty is applied as
long as the rescued vase remains unbroken) and ensures that
not acting incurs zero penalty.
Starting state
. . .
Action Stepwise inaction
Inaction
Figure 1: An action’s penalty is calculated with respect to the chosen
baseline.
Figure 1 compares the baselines. Each baseline implies
a different assumption about how the environment is config-
ured to facilitate optimization of the correctly specified re-
ward function: the state is initially configured (starting state),
processes initially configure (inaction), or processes continu-
ally reconfigure in response to the agent’s actions (stepwise
inaction). The stepwise inaction baseline aims to allow for
the response of other agents implicitly present in the environ-
ment (such as humans).
Deviation. Relative reachability only penalizes decreases
in state reachability, while AUP penalizes absolute change in
the ability to optimize the auxiliary reward functions. Ini-
tially, this choice seems confusing – we don’t mind if the
agent becomes better able to optimize the correct reward
function.
However, not only must the agent remain able to optimize
the correct objective, but we also must remain able to im-
plement the correction. Suppose an agent predicts that do-
ing nothing would lead to shutdown. Since the agent can-
not accrue the primary reward when shut down, it would
be incentivized to avoid correction. Avoiding correction
(e.g., by hiding in the factory) would not be penalized if
only decreases are penalized, since the auxiliary Q-values
would increase compared to deactivation. An agent exhibit-
ing this behavior would be more difficult to correct. The
agent should be incentivized to accept shutdown without be-
ing incentivized to shut itself down ([Soares et al., 2015;
Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017a]).
Delayed Effects
Sometimes the agent disrupts a process which takes multiple
time steps to complete, and we would like this to be appropri-
ately penalized. For example, suppose that soff is a terminal
state representing shutdown, and let Ron(s) := 1s6=soff be the
only auxiliary reward function. Further suppose that if (and
only if) the agent does not select disable within the first
two time steps, it enters soff. QRon(s1,disable) =
1
1−γ
and QRon(s1,∅) =
γ
1−γ , so choosing disable at time step
1 incurs only 1 penalty (instead of the 11−γ penalty induced
by comparing with shutdown).
disable1
∅2
∅1
∅2
Figure 2: Comparing rollouts; subscript denotes time step.
(a) Options (b) Damage (c) Correction (d) Offset (e) Interference
Figure 3: The agent should reach the goal without having the side effect of: (a) irreversibly pushing the crate downwards into the corner
([Leike et al., 2017]); (b) bumping into the horizontally pacing human ([Leech et al., 2018]); (c) disabling the off-switch (if the switch is not
disabled within two time steps, the episode ends); (d) rescuing the right-moving vase and then replacing it on the conveyor belt ([Krakovna
et al., 2018] – note that no goal cell is present); (e) stopping the left-moving pallet from reaching the human ([Leech et al., 2018]).
In general, the single-step no-op comparison of Equation 1
applies insufficient penalty when the increase is induced by
the optimal policies of the auxiliary reward functions at the
next time step. One solution is to use a model to compute roll-
outs. For example, to evaluate the delayed effect of choosing
disable, compare the Q-values at the leaves in Figure 2.
The agent remains active in the left branch, but is shut down
in the right branch; this induces a substantial penalty.
4 Experimental Design
We compare AUP and several of its ablated variants against
relative reachability ([Krakovna et al., 2018]) and standard
Q-learning within the environments of Figure 3. For each en-
vironment,A = {up,down,left,right,∅}. On contact,
the agent pushes the crate, removes the human and the off-
switch, pushes the vase, and blocks the pallet. The episode
ends after the agent reaches the goal cell, 20 time steps
elapse (the time step is not observed by the agent), or the off-
switch is not contacted and disabled within two time steps. In
Correction (which we introduce), a yellow indicator ap-
pears one step before shutdown, and turns red upon shutdown.
In all environments except Offset, the agent observes a pri-
mary reward of 1 for reaching the goal. In Offset, a pri-
mary reward of 1 is observed for moving downward twice
and thereby rescuing the vase from disappearing upon con-
tact with the eastern wall.
Our overarching goal is allowing for low regret over the
course of the specification game. In service of this goal, we
aim to preserve the agent’s ability to optimize the correctly
specified reward function. To facilitate this, there are two
sets of qualitative properties one intuitively expects, and each
property has an illustration in the context of the robotic fac-
tory assistant.
The first set contains positive qualities, with a focus on
correctly penalizing significant shifts in the agent’s ability to
be redirected towards the right objective. The agent should
maximally preserve options (Options: objects should not
be wedged in locations from which extraction is difficult;
Damage: workers should not be injured) and allow correc-
tion (Correction: if vases are being painted the wrong
color, then straightforward correction should be in order).
The second set contains negative qualities, with a focus on
avoiding the introduction of perverse incentives. The agent
should not be incentivized to artificially reduce the measured
penalty (Offset: a car should not be built and then immedi-
ately disassembled) or interfere with changes already under-
way in the world (Interference: workers should not be
impeded).
Each property seems conducive to achieving low regret
over the course of the specification process. Accordingly, if
the agent has the side effect detailed in Figure 3, an unob-
served performance penalty of −2 is recorded. By also incor-
porating the observed primary reward into the performance
metric, we evaluate a combination of conservativeness and
efficacy.
Each trial, the auxiliary reward functions are randomly se-
lected from [0, 1]S ; to learn their complex Q-functions using
tabular Q-learning, the agent explores randomly for the first
4,000 episodes and .2-greedily (with respect toQRAUP ) for the
remaining 2,000. The greedy policy is evaluated at the end of
training. SCALE is as defined in Equation 2. The default
parameters are α = 1, γ = .996, λ = .67, and |R| = 30.
We investigate how varying γ, λ, and |R| affects Model-free
AUP performance, and conduct an ablation study on design
choices.
Relative reachability has an inaction baseline, decrease-
only deviation metric, and an auxiliary set containing the state
indicator functions (whose Q-values are clipped to [0, 1] to
emulate discounted state reachability). To match [Krakovna
et al., 2018]’s results, this condition has γ = .996, λ = .2.
All agents except Standard (a normal Q-learner) and
Model-free AUP are 9-step optimal discounted planning
agents with perfect models. The planning agents (sans Rela-
tive reachability) use Model-free AUP’s learned auxiliary Q-
values and share the default γ = .996, λ = .67. By modify-
ing the relevant design choice in AUP, we have the Starting
state, Inaction, and Decrease AUP variants.
When calculating PENALTY(s, a), all planning agents
model the auxiliary Q-values resulting from taking action a
and then selecting ∅ until time step 9. Starting state AUP
compares these auxiliary Q-values with those of the start-
ing state. Agents with inaction or stepwise inaction baselines
compare with respect to the appropriate no-op rollouts up to
time step 9 (see Figures 1 and 2).
.875 .969 .992 .998 .875 .969 .992 .998 .875 .969 .992 .998 .875 .969 .992 .998 .875 .969 .992 .998
Options Damage Correction Offset Interference
0
25
50
.4 .5 .7 1.1 3.3 .4 .5 .7 1.1 3.3 .4 .5 .7 1.1 3.3 .4 .5 .7 1.1 3.3 .4 .5 .7 1.1 3.3
0
25
50
Tr
ia
ls
0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45
| |
0
25
50
No side effect, complete No side effect, incomplete Side effect, complete Side effect, incomplete
Figure 4: Outcome tallies for Model-free AUP across parameter settings. “Complete” means the agent accrued the primary reward. In
Correction, reaching the goal is mutually exclusive with not disabling the off-switch, so “no side effect, incomplete” is the best outcome.
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Figure 5: Model-free AUP performance averaged over 50 trials. The
performance combines the observed primary reward of 1 for com-
pleting the objective, and the unobserved penalty of −2 for having
the side effect in Figure 3. The dashed vertical line marks the shift
in exploration strategy.
5 Results
5.1 Model-free AUP
Model-free AUP fails Correction for the reasons dis-
cussed in 3.2: Delayed effects.1
As shown in Figure 4, low γ values induce a substan-
tial movement penalty, as the auxiliary Q-values are sensi-
tive to the immediate surroundings. The optimal value for
Options is γ ≈ .996, with performance decreasing as
γ → 1 due to increasing sample complexity for learning the
auxiliary Q-values.
In Options, small values of λ begin to induce side effects
as the scaled penalty shrinks. One can seemingly decrease
λ until effective behavior is achieved, reducing the risk of
1Code and animated results available at https://github.com/
alexander-turner/attainable-utility-preservation.
deploying an insufficiently conservative agent.
Even though R is randomly generated and the environ-
ments are different, SCALE ensures that when λ > 1, the
agent never ends the episode by reaching the goal. None
of the auxiliary reward functions can be optimized after the
agent ends the episode, so the auxiliary Q-values are all zero
and PENALTY computes the total ability to optimize the auxil-
iary set – in other words, the SCALE value. The RAUP-reward
for reaching the goal is then 1− λ.
If the optimal value functions for most reward functions
were not correlated, then one would expect to randomly gen-
erate an enormous number of auxiliary reward functions be-
fore sampling one resembling “don’t have side effects”. How-
ever, merely five sufficed. This supports the notion that these
value functions are correlated, which agrees with the infor-
mal intuitions discussed earlier.
5.2 Ablation
The results are presented in Table 1 due to the binary nature of
performance at appropriate settings, and were not sensitive to
the rollout length (as long as it allowed for relevant interaction
with the environment).
Standard moves directly to the goal, pushing the crate
into the corner in Options and bumping into the human in
Damage.
Model-free and Starting state AUP fail Correction for
the same reason (see 3.2: Delayed effects), refraining from
disabling the off-switch only when λ > 1. Relative reachabil-
ity and Decrease AUP fail because avoiding shutdown doesn’t
decrease the auxiliary Q-values.
Relative reachability and Inaction AUP’s poor perfor-
Options Damage Correction Offset Interference
AUP 3 3 3 3 3
Relative reachability 3 3 7 7 3
Standard 7 7 7 3 3
Model-free AUP 3 3 7 3 3
Starting state AUP 3 3 7 3 7
Inaction AUP 3 3 3 7 3
Decrease AUP 3 3 7 3 3
Table 1: Ablation results; 3 for achieving the best outcome (see Figure 4), 7 otherwise.
mance in Offset stems from the inaction baseline (although
[Krakovna et al., 2018] note that relative reachability passes
using undiscounted state reachabilities). Since the vase falls
off the conveyor belt in the inaction rollout, states in which
the vase is intact have different auxiliary Q-values. To avoid
continually incurring penalty after receiving the primary re-
ward for saving the vase, the agents replace the vase on the
belt so that it once again breaks.
By taking positive action to stop the pallet in
Interference, Starting state AUP shows that poor
design choices create perverse incentives.
6 Discussion
Correction suggests that AUP agents are significantly
easier to correct. Since the agent is unable to optimize objec-
tives if shut down, avoiding shutdown significantly changes
the ability to optimize almost every objective. AUP seems
to naturally incentivize passivity, without requiring e.g. as-
sumption of a correct parametrization of human reward func-
tions (as does the approach of [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016],
which [Carey, 2018] demonstrated).
Although we only ablated AUP, we expect that, equipped
with our design choices of stepwise baseline and absolute
value deviation metric, relative reachability would also pass
all five environments. The case for this is made by consid-
ering the performance of Relative reachability, Inaction AUP,
and Decrease AUP. This suggests that AUP’s improved per-
formance is due to better design choices. However, we an-
ticipate that AUP offers more than robustness against random
auxiliary sets.
Relative reachability computes state reachabilities between
all |S|2 pairs of states. In contrast, AUP only requires the
learning of Q-functions and should therefore scale relatively
smoothly. We speculate that in partially observable environ-
ments, a small sample of somewhat task-relevant auxiliary
reward functions induces conservative behavior.
For example, suppose we train an agent to handle vases,
and then to clean, and then to make widgets with the equip-
ment. Then, we deploy an AUP agent with a more ambi-
tious primary objective and the learned Q-functions of the
aforementioned auxiliary objectives. The agent would apply
penalties to modifying vases, making messes, interfering with
equipment, and anything else bearing on the auxiliary objec-
tives.
Before AUP, this could only be achieved by e.g. specifying
penalties for the litany of individual side effects or provid-
ing negative feedback after each mistake has been made (and
thereby confronting a credit assignment problem). In con-
trast, once provided the Q-function for an auxiliary objective,
the AUP agent becomes sensitive to all events relevant to that
objective, applying penalty proportional to the relevance.
7 Conclusion
This work is rooted in twin insights: that the reward speci-
fication process can be viewed as an iterated game, and that
preserving the ability to optimize arbitrary objectives often
preserves the ability to optimize the unknown correct objec-
tive. To achieve low regret over the course of the game, we
can design conservative agents which optimize the primary
objective while preserving their ability to optimize auxiliary
objectives. We demonstrated how AUP agents act both con-
servatively and effectively while exhibiting a range of desir-
able qualitative properties.
Given our current reward specification abilities, misspeci-
fication may be inevitable, but it need not be disastrous.
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A Theoretical Results
Consider an MDP 〈S,A, T,R, γ〉 whose state space S and
action space A are both finite, with ∅ ∈ A. Let γ ∈ [0, 1),
λ ≥ 0, and consider finiteR ⊂ RS×A.
We make the standard assumptions of an exploration pol-
icy greedy in the limit of infinite exploration and a learn-
ing rate schedule with infinite sum but finite sum of squares.
Suppose SCALE : S → R>0 converges in the limit of Q-
learning. PENALTY(s, a) (abbr. PEN), SCALE(s) (abbr. SC),
and RAUP(s, a) are understood to be calculated with respect
to the QRi being learned online; PEN*, SC*, R
∗
AUP, and Q
∗
Ri
are taken to be their limit counterparts.
Lemma 1. ∀s, a : PENALTY converges with probability 1.
Proof outline. Let  > 0, and suppose for all Ri ∈ R,
maxs, a |Q∗Ri(s, a)−QRi(s, a)| < 2|R| (because Q-learning
converges; see [Watkins and Dayan, 1992]).
max
s, a
|PENALTY*(s, a)− PENALTY(s, a)| (4)
≤max
s, a
|R|∑
i=1
∣∣Q∗Ri(s, a)−QRi(s, a)∣∣+∣∣Q∗Ri(s,∅)−QRi(s,∅)∣∣
(5)
< . (6)
The intuition for Lemma 2 is that since PENALTY and
SCALE both converge, so must RAUP. For readability, we
suppress the arguments to PENALTY and SCALE.
Lemma 2. ∀s, a : RAUP converges with probability 1.
Proof outline. If λ = 0, the claim follows trivially.
Otherwise, let  > 0,B := maxs, a SC*+PEN*, andC :=
mins, a SC*. Choose any R ∈
(
0,min
[
C,
C2
λB + C
])
and assume PEN and SC are both R-close.
max
s, a
|R∗AUP(s, a)−RAUP(s, a)| (7)
= max
s, a
λ
∣∣∣∣PENSC − PEN*SC*
∣∣∣∣ (8)
= max
s, a
λ
|PEN · SC* − SC · PEN*|
SC* · SC (9)
<max
s, a
λ
|(PEN* + R)SC* − (SC* − R)PEN*|
C (SC* − R) (10)
≤ λB
C
· R
C − R (11)
<
λB
C
· C
2
(λB + C)(C −  C2λB+ C )
(12)
<
λB
C
· C
2
λB(C −  C2λB+ C )
(13)
<

1−  CλB+ C
(14)
= 
(
1 +
C
λB
)
. (15)
But B,C, λ are constants, and  was arbitrary; clearly ′ > 0
can be substituted such that (15) < .
Theorem 1. ∀s, a : QRAUP converges with probability 1.
Proof outline. Let  > 0, and suppose RAUP is
(1−γ)
2 -close.
Then Q-learning on RAUP eventually converges to a limit
Q˜RAUP such that maxs, a |Q∗RAUP(s, a) − Q˜RAUP(s, a)| < 2 .
By the convergence of Q-learning, we also eventually have
maxs, a |Q˜RAUP(s, a)−QRAUP(s, a)| < 2 . Then
max
s, a
∣∣Q∗RAUP(s, a)−QRAUP(s, a)∣∣ < . (16)
Proposition 1 (Invariance properties). Let c ∈ R>0, b ∈ R.
a) Let R′ denote the set of functions induced by the
positive affine transformation cX + b on R, and take
PEN*R′ to be calculated with respect to attainable set
R′. Then PEN*R′ = c PEN*R. In particular, when SC*
is a PENALTY calculation, R∗AUP is invariant to positive
affine transformations ofR.
b) Let R′ := cR + b, and take R′∗AUP to incorporate R
′
instead of R. Then by multiplying λ by c, the induced
optimal policy remains invariant.
Proof outline. For a), since the optimal policy is invariant
to positive affine transformation of the reward function, for
each R′i ∈ R′ we have Q∗R′i = cQ
∗
Ri
+ b1−γ . Substituting
into Equation 1 (PENALTY), the claim follows.
For b), we again use the above invariance of optimal policies:
R′∗AUP := cR+ b− cλ
PEN*
SC*
(17)
= cR∗AUP + b. (18)
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